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We introduce symmetric extensions of bipartite quantum states as a tool for analyzing protocols that dis-
till secret key from quantum correlations. Whether the correlations are coming from a prepare-and-measure
quantum key distribution scheme or from an entanglement-based scheme, the protocol has to produce effective
states without a symmetric extension in order to succeed. By formulating the symmetric extension problem
as a semidefinite program, we solve the problem for Bell-diagonal states. Applying this result to the six-state
and BB84 schemes, we show that for the entangled states that cannot be distilled by current key distillation
procedures, the failure can be understood in terms of a failure to break a symmetric extension.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Mn
I. INTRODUCTION
An important quantity characterizing the performance of
a quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme is the maximum
amount of channel noise which can be tolerated before the
protocol fails to produce a secure key.
This threshold has clear implications for QKD as a
potentially-realizable technology and not just as a possibil-
ity inherent in the formalism of quantum mechanics. It also
relates to an important issue of principle, namely, the connec-
tion between quantum mechanics and privacy. What aspects
of quantum mechanics are responsible for the possibility of
key distribution and other cryptographic protocols? Determin-
ing the threshold, or at least bounding it, gives us insight into
this issue. Particular properties of quantum states and chan-
nels which are sufficient for generating privacy in some way
lead to lower bounds, while identifying properties necessary
for privacy leads to upper bounds.
One such property is the symmetric extendibility of bipar-
tite quantum states. Suppose that two honest parties Alice and
Bob share a state ρAB from which they would like to extract
a secret key using one-way public communication from her
side to his. This task is impossible should there exist a tripar-
tite state ρABB
′
such that the AB′ marginal state is identical
to the AB marginal ρAB
′
= ρAB . If such a state exists it can
always be chosen to be symmetric between B and B′, i.e., the
state is invariant when B and B′ are swapped. Such a tripar-
tite state is called a symmetric extension of the original state,
and the equality of the marginals means that the extra system
B′ essentially functions as a copy of system B. Assuming the
worst-case scenario that an eavesdropper Eve holds B′, what-
ever process Bob uses to create an error free bit string after re-
ceiving the communication from Alice can also be performed
by Eve, and thus the bit string cannot be private [1].
The question of symmetric extendibility is relevant in many
∗Electronic address: gomyhr@iqc.ca
areas of quantum information theory, from Bell-inequalities
[2] to quantum channel capacity [3]. In QKD, the neces-
sary condition of not having a symmetric extension has been
translated into upper bounds on the key rate and threshold
noise rate for one way procedures in [1]. A considerable ad-
vantage of this approach stems from the fact that the upper
bounds are determined without having to construct concrete
eavesdropping attacks. Moreover, for systems described by
Hilbert spaces of modest dimension, symmetric extensions
can be efficiently constructed—when they exist—by means
of semidefinite programming.
In this paper, we consider the case of two-way commu-
nication and use the symmetric extension to derive attack-
independent upper bounds for the BB84 [4] and six-state [5]
schemes. At first glance, symmetric extensions appear to be
irrelevant to the problem, since the two-way nature of the
communication creates an asymmetry between the honest and
dishonest parties—Eve cannot pretend to be one of the hon-
est parties. However, every two-way communication proce-
dure consists of alternating rounds of one-way communica-
tion, which must eventually terminate if the protocol is to es-
tablish a secret key that can be used in other applications. The
final step thus involves only one-way communication, and the
question of symmetric extendibility again becomes relevant.
From this point of view, it becomes clear that the goal of the
two-way communication is to break any existing symmetric
extension of the input state.
To avoid confusion, we distinguish between a QKD proto-
col, a QKD scheme, and the various procedures such as advan-
tage distillation, error correction, and privacy amplification.
By a QKD scheme, we mean the generation of correlated data
by distributing quantum particles and measuring them. For
simplicity we will also include the parameter estimation and
sifting in the definition of the scheme. Including the sifting
means that BB84 [4] and SARG04 [6] are different schemes,
even though the signal states and measurements are the same.
For a given scheme, the key distillation procedures following
it can be chosen in different ways which give different thresh-
olds. We call the whole process a QKD protocol, so that at the
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2end of the protocol the parties have a secret key that is ready
for use.
Given a particular two-way procedure, then, the question of
symmetric extendibility leads to an upper bound on the noise
threshold given by the noisiest state for which the procedure
just fails to break the extension. Generally one must resort
to finding an approximate symmetric extension by solving
the semidefinite program numerically. For the well-known
BB84 [4] and six-state [5] schemes, however, the relevant
states can be assumed without loss of generality to be diago-
nal in a basis of maximally entangled states: the so-called Bell
basis. By making use of the symmetries of the Bell states, we
can answer the question of symmetric extendibility by solv-
ing the semidefinite program analytically, which then leads to
exact upper bounds for the tolerable error rates. For the two-
way procedure outlined by Chau [7], we show that the up-
per bound for the two schemes meets the lower bound given
therein and that this procedure is optimal for a wide range of
two-way procedures. This agrees with the results reported by
Acı´n et al. [8], who based their upper bound on an explicit
eavesdropping attack.
Our results are organized as follows. In Sec. II, we examine
in detail the role played by the symmetric extension in two-
way QKD protocols. In Sec. III we review the formulation of
the symmetric extension problem as a semidefinite program
(SDP), simplify, and solve it for Bell-diagonal states and give
an analytic expression for the boundary of extendible Bell-
diagonal states. Section IV describes Chau’s two-way com-
munication procedure and shows that above the known lower
bound on the threshold, the procedure fails to break the sym-
metric extension and can therefore not lead to a secret key. We
also discuss variations of this procedure which turn out to be
equivalent for distillability. In Sec. V we sum up and discuss
some open questions.
II. BREAKING SYMMETRIC EXTENSIONS
One goal of the portion of a QKD protocol involving two-
way communication is to transform a state having a sym-
metric extension into one which does not. In a prepare and
measure (P&M) scheme, there is never an actual bipartite
entangled state, but any such scheme can be modeled as an
entanglement-based scheme where Alice prepares an entan-
gled state and sends half of it to Bob. When Alice measures
her half of the entangled state, this effectively prepares the
other half in one of the signal states of the P&M protocol [9].
Eve may interfere with the transmitted signal in any manner
of her choosing, so after making their respective measure-
ments, Alice and Bob compare a portion of the data in or-
der to determine—at least roughly—what particular quantum
state ρAB they share. This state is the starting point for our
analysis and is any state obeying
pjk = Tr
[
ρAB (Aj ⊗Bk)
]
, (1)
where Aj and Bk are the POVM elements of Alice’s and
Bob’s respective measurements and pjk are the probabilities
with which Alice and Bob obtain outcomes corresponding to
Aj and Bk, respectively. Any subsequent processing of the
measurement data is then modeled as a coherent processing
on the quantum states with any classical communication cor-
responding to measurement outcomes. This allows us to track
the effective state throughout the protocol.
Now we can investigate which two-way processing proce-
dures can break symmetric extensions. By making a few as-
sumptions on the form of the procedure, we can simplify the
problem considerably. Assume that each round of one-way
processing is performed on blocks with a finite number of sys-
tems, such that the output is considered as a single system in
the next round. As we are not concerned with the rate of dis-
tillation, only whether the state is at all distillable or not, we
are led to the following two simplifications.
First, we only need to concern ourselves with filtering
operations—quantum operations defined by a single Kraus
operator—which do not always succeed when applied to a
state. There is a corresponding Kraus operator for failure,
which makes the operation trace-preserving, but we discard
the failure outcomes and therefore a filter is in general not
trace-preserving. If ρAB is the state of the block before
postprocessing, the unnormalized state after Bob applies the
filter K is (1 ⊗ K)ρAB(1 ⊗ K)† and the filter satisfies
K†K ≤ 1. If an operation with more than one Kraus op-
erator is able to break the symmetric extension — that is∑
j(1 ⊗ Kj)ρAB(1 ⊗ Kj)† (where
∑
j K
†
jKj ≤ 1) has no
symmetric extension — then because of convexity at least one
of the (1⊗Kj)ρAB(1⊗Kj)† must be without symmetric ex-
tension, so the filter Kj alone will break the extension.
Second, we can reduce the finite number of one-way rounds
to only two, for the following reason. Assume that the final
round of communication is from Alice to Bob. Bob can start
the procedure already at his last round by guessing ahead of
time what Alice’s messages related to that block would have
been and perform the corresponding local operations. Usually
this guess will be wrong and Alice will tell Bob to discard
those blocks in the final round. For the tiny fraction of the
blocks where Bob guessed correctly, Alice can proceed with
her last round. This means that if the symmetric extension
can be broken during a two-way procedure, it must also be
possible to break it with a single filter on a block of copies of
Bob’s system.
III. EXTENDIBILITY OF BELL-DIAGONAL STATES
Bell-diagonal states are two-qubit states that are diagonal
in the basis of maximally entangled states |Φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 ±
|11〉), |Ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉). Such states can be pro-
duced by sending half of the maximally entangled state |Φ+〉
through a Pauli channel with error probabilities px, py , and pz
for the σx, σy , and σz errors respectively. This results in the
state ρAB = pI |Φ+〉〈Φ+| + px|Ψ+〉〈Ψ+| + py|Ψ−〉〈Ψ−| +
pz|Φ−〉〈Φ−|, where pI = 1 − px − py − pz . For com-
pactness, we will also denote this as ρAB =
∑
j pj |βj〉〈βj |
where the index j runs over the set {I, x, y, z} or equivalently
{0, 1, 2, 3}.
3In the six-state and BB84 QKD schemes considered here,
the effective quantum states describing the systems held by
Alice and Bob can be taken to be Bell diagonal for the fol-
lowing reason. First, Alice and Bob discard all data from
mismatched bases, and they can assume the worst case sce-
nario which is that the corresponding outcomes are com-
pletely uncorrelated. This implies Tr[ρAB(σAi ⊗ σBj )] = 0
for i 6= j, i, j 6= 0, where σi are the Pauli operators. Fur-
ther, Alice and Bob randomly (but jointly) decide which state
in each basis corresponds to which bit value, so the corre-
lations in each basis are characterized by a single error rate
qj = 1− p0− pj for j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. From this condition, it fol-
lows that Tr[ρAB(σAi ⊗ 1B)] = Tr[ρAB(1A ⊗ σBi )] = 0 for
i 6= 0, and this leaves only σi⊗σi, and it is easy to verify that
this means the state is Bell diagonal. In the six-state scheme,
there are three bases, so the corresponding error rates deter-
mine the Bell-diagonal state completely. In the BB84 case,
the error rate in the y basis is not known, leaving an equiva-
lence class of possible states.
The Bell-diagonal states have a number of appealing and
useful properties. For instance, it is possible to reduce any
bipartite qubit state to the Bell-diagonal form by “twirling,”
choosing a Pauli σi and applying σAi ⊗ σBi on the state
[10]. Generic two-qubit states can also be filtered to the Bell-
diagonal form with a two-side filtering [11]. Finally, any two-
qubit state where both reduced states are maximally mixed is
Bell-diagonal with the right choice of local basis [12], and a
local change of basis can also rearrange the pj in any order.
For our purposes, a parametrization different from the pj
will be useful. The analysis of both symmetric extension and
key distillation is simplified using the following parameters:
α0 = pI + px + py + pz, (2a)
α1 = pI − px − py + pz, (2b)
α2 =
√
2(pI − pz), (2c)
α3 =
√
2(px − py), (2d)
which gives the inverse transformation
pI = 14 (α0 + α1 +
√
2α2), (3a)
px = 14 (α0 − α1 +
√
2α3), (3b)
py = 14 (α0 − α1 −
√
2α3), (3c)
pz = 14 (α0 + α1 −
√
2α2). (3d)
Because of normalization, α0 = 1 for all probability vec-
tors. So all Bell-diagonal states are uniquely defined by
the coordinates (α1, α2, α3). The maximally entangled
states are in these coordinates |Φ±〉: (1,±√2, 0) and |Ψ±〉:
(−1, 0,±√2). The convex hull of these four points is a tetra-
hedron, which represents the set of Bell-diagonal states. This
region is defined by the four inequalities
α1 ±
√
2α2 ≥ −1 and − α1 ±
√
2α3 ≥ −1, (4)
each corresponding to a particular eigenvalue being non-
negative.
A. Formulation as a semidefinite program (SDP)
Recall that a state ρAB has a symmetric extension if there
exists a state ρABB
′
which is such that TrB′ [ρABB
′
] = ρAB
and VBB′ρABB
′
V †BB′ = ρ
ABB′ , where VBB′ is the unitary
operation swapping B and B′. The question of whether or
not ρAB has a symmetric extension can be formulated as a
semidefinite program (SDP) [13, 14]: a convex optimization
of a linear function over the convex cone of positive matri-
ces. These can be efficiently solved numerically for low-
dimensional systems using interior point algorithms [15, 16].
The following discussion is adapted from [16]. Consider the
following maximization, a semidefinite program:
maximize 1− Tr[XABB′ ],
subject to Tr [L˜ABB
′
i X
ABB′ ] = Tr[LABi ρ
AB ],
XABB
′ ≥ 0. (5)
The free variable to be optimized, XABB
′
, is an operator on
HA⊗HB⊗HB′ , and {LABi } is a basis for traceless operators
on HA ⊗HB . Further, L˜ABB′i := SymBB′(LABi ⊗ 1B
′
) for
SymBB′ the quantum operation symmetrizing systems B and
B′, SymBB′(MABB
′
) := (MABB
′
+ VBB′MABB
′
V †BB′)/2
using the swap operator VBB′ .
If the optimum value of the objective function is non-
negative, a suitable multiple t (≥ 0) of 1ABB′ can be
added to XABB
′
in order to satisfy the normalization con-
dition Tr[XABB
′
+ t1ABB
′
] = 1, and the extension is then
given by ρABB
′
= SymBB′(XABB
′
+ t1ABB
′
). This sym-
metrization ensures that VBB′ρABB
′
V †BB′ = ρ
ABB′ . To
see that the constraints on XABB
′
in the SDP ensure that
TrB′ [ρABB
′
] = ρAB , we use the facts that for any opera-
tors MAB and NABC , we have that MABTrC [NABC ] =
TrC [(MAB⊗1C)NABC ] and that for any PABC andQABC ,
Tr[PABCSymBC(QABC)] = Tr[SymBC(PABC)QABC ].
We then get that for all i,
Tr[LABi TrB′ [SymBB′(X
ABB′)]]
= Tr[(LABi ⊗ 1B
′
)SymBB′(X
ABB′)]
= Tr[SymBB′(L
AB
i ⊗ 1B
′
)XABB
′
]
= Tr[LABi ρ
AB ],
where the last equality is from the constraint of the SDP
(5). Since {LABi } is a basis for the traceless operators
on HA ⊗ HB , we therefore have that the traceless part of
TrB′ [SymBB′(XABB
′
)] is equal to the traceless part of ρAB .
Also, Tr[ρABB
′
] = Tr[ρAB ] = 1, so TrB′ [ρABB
′
] = ρAB .
If the maximum value is negative, no positive semidefinite
extension can be constructed because if ρABB
′
were a sym-
metric extension of ρAB , the choice XABB
′
= ρABB
′
would
satisfy the constraints and give the objective function a value
of 0.
To every SDP, there is an associated dual SDP which for
the symmetric extension problem is somewhat easier to work
4with. The dual of Eq. (5) is
minimize Tr[KABρAB ],
subject to K˜ABB
′ ≥ 0, (6)
where KAB := 1AB +
∑
j ljL
AB
j , K˜
ABB′ :=
SymBB′(KAB ⊗ 1B
′
), and lj are free variables to be op-
timized. We refer to this optimization as the dual prob-
lem and the original optimization (5) as the primal problem.
Should ρAB have a symmetric extension, Tr[KABρAB ] =
Tr[K˜ABB
′
ρABB
′
] ≥ 0, since the trace of the product of
two positive operators is non-negative. Thus a sufficient con-
dition for ρAB not to be extendible is for the minimum of
Tr[KABρAB ] to be negative. As we discuss below, this con-
dition is also necessary, due to a property known as strong
duality.
Weak duality holds that the optimum value of the primal
problem is always less than the optimum of the dual, which
follows from the positivity constraints,
Tr[KABρAB ]− (1− Tr[XABB′ ])
= Tr[K˜ABB
′
XABB
′
] ≥ 0, (7)
where the equality follows from Tr[KABρAB ] =
Tr[K˜ABB
′
ρABB
′
] = Tr[K˜ABB
′
(XABB
′
+ t1ABB
′
)]
and 1− Tr[XABB′ ] = Tr[t1ABB′ ].
Strong duality is the statement that the optimum values of
the primal and dual problems are equal. Sufficient conditions
for strong duality are known. In particular, a semidefinite pro-
gram is said to be strictly feasible if the constraints can be
satisfied by a matrix that is positive definite rather than just
positive semidefinite. The strict feasibility of either the pri-
mal or dual semidefinite programs is sufficient to guarantee
strong duality (theorem 3.1 [13]). If both the primal and the
dual are strictly feasible then we are also guaranteed that there
exist matrices XABB
′
opt and K˜
ABB′
opt that satisfy the constraints
and attain the optimum of the primal and dual program, re-
spectively, (theorem 3.1 [13]).
The dual problem is obviously strictly feasible just by tak-
ing KAB = 1AB . On the primal side, note that there must
be some, not necessarily positive, XABB
′
meeting the con-
straints, since these underdetermine the components. As the
constraints only involve the traceless part of XABB
′
, a suit-
able multiple of the identity 1ABB
′
can always be added
to ensure positivity. From strict feasibility, we obtain the
sufficiency condition that min(Tr[KABρAB ]) > 0 implies
ρAB is extendible1. Moreover, when the optima are equal,
Tr[K˜ABB
′
opt X
ABB′
opt ] = 0, and hence K˜
ABB′
opt X
ABB′
opt = 0.
This condition is termed complementary slackness and will
play an important role in the analytical solution.
1 In this manner, the dual SDP constructs a witness for the (lack of) symmet-
ric extension, a Hermitian operator KAB which defines a hyperplane in
the set of positive operators separating the given state ρAB from the con-
vex set of extendible states [17]. Strict feasibility implies that we only need
to consider Hermitian KAB for which eKABB′ ≥ 0.
B. Simplifying the SDP for Bell-diagonal states
Now consider the dual form of the SDP, [Eq. (6)]. By ex-
ploiting the symmetry of the problem, we can find an ana-
lytic solution. The method for dealing with symmetry follows
the general prescription of Gatermann and Parrilo [18], but
takes advantage of several special properties of this problem.
Because ρAB is Bell diagonal, it is invariant under conjuga-
tion by Pauli operators σi ⊗ σi. This induces a symmetry of
the objective function, since Tr[(σi ⊗ σi)K(σi ⊗ σi)†ρ] =
Tr[Kρ] for any i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Moreover, the constraint
K˜ABB = SymBB′(KAB ⊗ 1B
′
) ≥ 0 is equivalent to
SymBB′((σi ⊗ σi)KAB(σi ⊗ σi)† ⊗ 1B
′
) ≥ 0. Hence, the
set of allowable K is invariant under arbitrary conjugation by
Pauli operators and since they all yield the same value of the
objective function, we can focus on those formed by the con-
vex combination K¯ = 14
∑3
i=0(σi ⊗ σi)K(σi ⊗ σi)† without
loss of generality. Since K¯ is a “twirl” of K, it is also Bell di-
agonal: K¯ =
∑
j kj |βj〉〈βj |. The kj satisfy
∑
j kj = 1, since
Tr[K¯] = Tr[(σi ⊗ σi)K(σi ⊗ σi)†] = 1, but not necessarily
kj ≥ 0. This simplifies the objective function Tr[KABρAB ]
to
∑
j kjpj with the additional constraint
∑
j kj = 1.
Next, we would like to use the symmetry of K¯ to simplify
the constraint K˜ABB
′ ≥ 0. For readability, we will—in this
and the next two paragraphs—write the Pauli operators as X ,
Y , and Z, and tensor products such as 1⊗ σx ⊗ σz as IXZ.
Observe that K˜ inherits invariance under the operators XXX
and ZZZ from K¯. We can simplify the calculation by observ-
ing that XXX and ZZZ are logical operators for the bit-flip
code. Because of the symmetry, it will be necessary for K˜
to be proportional to the identity on the code space. K˜ has a
symmetry under swapping B and B′ that we will also wish
to take advantage of. We can proceed by identifying three
“logical” or encoded qubits F , G, and H on the Hilbert space
HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HB′ , such that the form of K˜ is simpler when
expressed in the computational basis ofHF ⊗HG⊗HH . The
encoded X- and Z-operators on the logical qubits are
XF := XXX, XG := XIX, XH := XXI
ZF := ZZZ, ZG := ZZI, ZH := ZIZ.
Note that with these definitions swapping B and B′ induces
a swap on G and H . It is simple to verify that the Pauli op-
erators on different logical qubits commute and that X and Z
anticommute on the same logical qubit. They therefore define
a valid encoding, and the encoded product vectors |ijk〉FGH
are the eight simultaneous eigenvectors of the encoded Z op-
erators,
|000〉FGH = |000〉ABB′ , |100〉FGH = |111〉ABB′ ,
|001〉FGH = |110〉ABB′ , |101〉FGH = |001〉ABB′ ,
|010〉FGH = |101〉ABB′ , |110〉FGH = |010〉ABB′ ,
|011〉FGH = |011〉ABB′ , |111〉FGH = |100〉ABB′ .
(8)
Since K˜ is invariant under the operators XXX and ZZZ,
we can immediately infer that K˜ ' 1F ⊗ K˜ ′GH . Further-
more, K˜ is by definition invariant under swapping the BB′
5systems, and swapping BB′ is the same as swapping GH .
This means that K˜ ′GH must be block diagonal with the sup-
port on the triplet and singlet subspaces. Since K¯ is Bell di-
agonal and SymBB′ is a linear superoperator, we can write
K˜ =
∑
j kjSymBB′(|βj〉〈βj | ⊗ 1B′). Converting the terms
SymBB′(|βj〉〈βj | ⊗ 1B′) into operators on the logical qubits
can be accomplished by writing it out in the computational
basis and using the relations (8).
Alternatively, the conversion can be done by noticing that
ZZI and XXI are encoded Z and X operators for logical
qubitsG andH , respectively. Thus, |Φ+〉〈Φ+|AB⊗1B′ is on
the +1 eigenspace of both ZG and XH , i.e., |Φ+〉〈Φ+|AB ⊗
1B′ ' 1F ⊗ |0+〉〈0+|GH . For |Φ−〉AB , we use that
|Φ−〉〈Φ−|AB ⊗ 1B′ = (ZII)(|Φ+〉〈Φ+|AB ⊗ 1B′)(ZII)†,
and since ZII commutes (anticommutes) with ZZI (XXI),
|Φ−〉〈Φ−|AB ⊗ 1B′ is on the +1 (−1) eigenspace of ZZI
(XXI). Therefore, |Φ−〉〈Φ−|AB⊗1B′ ' 1F⊗|0−〉〈0−|GH .
Similarly, |Ψ+〉AB and |Ψ−〉AB correspond to |1+〉GH and
|1−〉GH , respectively. Applying the swap symmetrization
SymBB′ to |βj〉〈βj | ⊗ 1B′ is simple given this concrete rep-
resentation, and the results have the following form. First,
each of the terms has the form SymBB′(|βj〉〈βj | ⊗ 1B′) '
1
81F⊗
(
Rj ⊕Ψ−GH
)
, whereRj has support only on the triplet
subspace. A simple calculation shows that the R matrices are
given by
RΦ± =
 2 ±√2 0±√2 1 0
0 0 0
 , (9)
RΨ± =
0 0 00 1 ±√2
0 ±√2 2
 , (10)
in the basis {|00〉, |Ψ+〉, |11〉}.
The semidefinite program (6) now becomes
minimize
∑3
i=0 kipi,
subject to
∑3
i=0 kiRi ≥ 0,∑3
i=0 ki = 1,
(11)
where {pi} ({ki}) are the eigenvalues of ρ (K¯). The latter
constraint can be eliminated by a further change of variables
according to Eq. (2) for both pi and ki, so that p → α and
k → x. The latter constraint now becomes simply x0 = 1,
and only x1, x2, and x3 remain as free variables. The ob-
jective function becomes (x0α0 +
∑3
j=1 xjαj)/4. Instead of
minimizing this directly, we multiply by 4 and subtract the
constant term x0α0 = 1. This gives us the following much-
simplified dual SDP which is equivalent to SDP (11) except
for a rescaled and shifted objective function,
minimize
3∑
j=1
xjαj ,
subject to F (x) = F0 +
3∑
i=1
xiFi ≥ 0,
(12)
using the matrices
F0 =
 1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1
 , F1 =
 1 0 00 0 0
0 0 −1
 ,
F2 =
 0 1 01 0 0
0 0 0
 , F3 =
 0 0 00 0 1
0 1 0
 .
If the minimum value of the objective function is greater than
or equal to −1, the state has a symmetric extension. Because
of the minimization, finding an x that satisfies the constraints
and such that the objective function is less than−1 is sufficient
to show that the state does not have a symmetric extension.
We can find the simplified form of the primal problem by
taking the dual of the SDP (12)
minimize Tr[Z],
subject to Tr[FiZ] = αi,
Z ≥ 0,
(13)
where again the state has a symmetric extension when
Tr[Z∗] ≤ 1. We use ∗ throughout to denote an optimal value
of a variable. Finding any Z that satisfies the constraints and
has trace less than or equal to 1 is sufficient to show that the
state has a symmetric extension.
C. Analytical solution of the SDP
In this section we will solve the simplified semidefinite pro-
gram using both the primal form (13) and the dual form (12).
For the states which have a symmetric extension, we prove
this by finding an explicit Z with Tr[Z] ≤ 1 which satisfies
the constraints of the SDP (13). When the state has no sym-
metric extension, this can be proven by finding an x such that
the constraints of (12) is satisfied and
∑3
j=1 xjαj ≤ −1, but
we will not use this.
As shown in Sec. III A, the optima Z∗ and F (x∗) from the
primal and dual problems obey the complementary slackness
condition
F (x∗)Z∗ = 0, (14)
and it is this condition that allows us to solve the semidefinite
program analytically and prove that certain states do not have
a symmetric extension. The first simplification we get from
condition (14) is that rank[F (x∗)] + rank(Z∗) ≤ 3 since
F (x∗) and Z∗ must have support on orthogonal subspaces.
Since both F (x∗) = 0 and Z∗ = 0 are excluded by the con-
straints, at least one of F (x∗) and Z∗ must have rank one.
The solution will proceed as follows. We first consider Z
of rank one. This will give us a sufficient condition for a sym-
metric extension. We then consider the case when this condi-
tion is not satisfied. Under the assumption that the state still
has a symmetric extension, we use complementary slackness
to show that there can only be four possible Z∗. If none of
these candidates satisfy Z ≥ 0, we get a contradiction and the
6state cannot have a symmetric extension. It turns out that the
candidates all satisfy Tr[Z] ≤ 1, though, so if one of them
also is positive semidefinite, it also proves that the state has a
symmetric extension.
Start by finding the possible values for the objective func-
tion when Z is rank one. From the constraints Tr[FiZ] = αi
of the primal problem, Z has the form
Z =
1
2
2(α1 + z33) α2 2z13α2 2z22 α3
2z13 α3 2z33
 . (15)
The objective function is the trace of this matrix, so we want
to determine z22 and z33 from the rank-one condition. Since
Z is real and symmetric, we can parametrize its eigenvector
with three real numbers ai. This gives an alternative charac-
terization of Z,
Z =
 a21 a1a2 a1a3a1a2 a22 a2a3
a1a3 a2a3 a
2
3
 , (16)
and we can solve the problem by equating these. Taking the
ratio of the 1,2 and 2,3 elements, we get a1/a3 = α2/α3
when a2, a3, α3 6= 0. The ratio of the 1,1 and 3,3 elements is
the square of this, which implies that z33 = a23 = α1α
2
3/(α
2
2−
α23). Now use the fact that the square of the 2,3 element equals
z22z33 to find z22 = (α22 − α23)/4α1. The objective function
is then
Tr[Z] =
(α22 − α23)2 + 4α21(α22 + α23)
4α1(α22 − α23)
, (17)
and since it is fixed by the state (and the requirement that Z
be rank one), no minimization is required. If this expression
is less than or equal to 1, the state has a symmetric extension
since Tr[Z∗] ≤ Tr[Z]. If the value is greater than 1, we cannot
conclude yet since it could be that Z∗ is of rank two and has
trace less than or equal to one. Thus,
4α1(α22 − α23)− (α22 − α23)2 − 4α21(α22 + α23) ≥ 0 (18)
is a sufficient but not necessary condition for the state to have
a symmetric extension.
If Eq. (18) is satisfied, we know that the state has a sym-
metric extension, so for the rest of this section we assume
that it is not. For a contradiction (in some cases), we now
assume that the state has a symmetric extension. This means
that rank(Z∗) = 2 and because of complementary slackness
rank[F (x∗)] = 1. We therefore want to find out for what pos-
sible x we get a rank one F (x). The dual problem (12) gives
us the form of F (x),
F (x) =
1 + x1 x2 0x2 1 x3
0 x3 1− x1
 .
In this case we proceed as before, expressing F (x) also as a
projection operator of the form (16) and using relations be-
tween the matrix elements. From the 1,3 element, it is clear
that either a3 or a1 must be zero. This zeroes out the first or
third column and row, and we immediately obtain x1 = ±1
and x3 = 0 or x2 = 0 for the former and latter cases, re-
spectively. This leaves a matrix with a non-zero 2 × 2 block,
which must have determinant zero. From this we get x22 = 2
and x23 = 2 in the two cases, so x = (x1, x2, x3) can only
take one of the four values (1,±√2, 0), (−1, 0,±√2). The
corresponding four values of the objective function in SDP
(12) are
α1 ±
√
2α2 and − α1 ±
√
2α3. (19)
If any of these would be less than −1, we would be able to
exclude the possibility of a symmetric extension at this point.
However, this is not possible for any states, since the four in-
equalities (4) defining the border of the set of Bell-diagonal
states are saying exactly that these four values are greater than
or equal to −1.
The four possible candidates for x∗ cannot by themselves
contradict our assumption of a symmetric extension for pos-
sible values of αi. However, under this assumption one of
these candidates must be optimal. There must, therefore, be a
complementary optimal Z∗ of the primal problem for which
the complementary slackness condition (14) is satisfied. For
each of the four possible x∗, we can impose the complemen-
tary slackness condition F (x)Z = 0 to a Z of the form
(15), and check if the resulting Z can be positive semidefi-
nite as required by the SDP conditions. For the two vectors
x = (1,±√2, 0), this gives the two possible matrices
Z =
1
2
√
2
 ∓α2 √2α2 ∓α3√2α2 ∓2α2 √2α3
∓α3
√
2α3 −2
√
2α1 ∓ α2
 . (20)
Since the second column is proportional to the first, the ma-
trix is positive semidefinite if and only if the lower right
2 × 2 block is. This is positive semidefinite if and only if
both the determinant and one of the diagonal elements are
non-negative. The determinant is in this case proportional to
2(α22 − α23) ± 4
√
2α1α2, so the matrix is positive semidefi-
nite if and only if ∓α2 ≥ 0 and α22 − α23 ± 2
√
2α1α2 ≥ 0.
The possible matrices for x = (−1, 0,±√2) are the matri-
ces we get from Eq. (20) by interchanging the first and third
rows and columns and making the substitutions α2 ↔ α3,
α1 ↔ −α1. The positivity conditions are ∓α3 ≥ 0 and
α23 − α22 ∓ 2
√
2α1α3 ≥ 0. Thus, if the state does not satisfy
condition (18), and also none of the four positivity constraints,
α22 − α23 ± 2
√
2α1α2 ≥ 0 and ∓ α2 ≥ 0, (21a)
α23 − α22 ∓ 2
√
2α1α3 ≥ 0 and ∓ α3 ≥ 0 (21b)
we cannot have rank[F (x∗) = 1], so our assumption that the
state has a symmetric extension is contradicted.
If on the other hand, one or more of the constraints are sat-
isfied, there is no contradiction and the state could have a sym-
metric extension. Actually, we can use the Z which satisfies
Z ≥ 0 to prove that a symmetric extension exists. Taking the
trace in Eq. (20) gives Tr[Z] = −α1 ∓
√
2α2 ≤ 1, where
7the inequality follows from the first two border inequalities
in Eq. (4). For the Z corresponding to x = (−1, 0,±√2),
we can show Tr[Z] ≤ 1 by using the other two border in-
equalities. The Z which is positive semidefinite will therefore
satisfy all the constraints of the primal SDP (13), and since it
gives a value of the objective function which is less than or
equal to 1, the state must have a symmetric extension.
Altogether, we have shown that if any of the conditions
(18), (21a), or (21b) are satisfied, the state has a symmetric ex-
tension, otherwise it does not. Since at least one of ∓α2 ≥ 0
always holds, we can combine the two options in Eq. (21a)
into one at the cost of adding an absolute value. We can do
the same for ∓α3 ≥ 0 in Eq. (21b) and combining everything
we get that a state has symmetric extension if and only if one
or more of the following three inequalities hold:
4α1(α22 − α23)− (α22 − α23)2 − 4α21(α22 + α23) ≥ 0, (22a)
α22 − α23 − 2
√
2α1|α2| ≥ 0, (22b)
α23 − α22 + 2
√
2α1|α3| ≥ 0. (22c)
The set of Bell-diagonal states with symmetric extension is
pictured in Fig. 1. Condition (22a) describes a body that in-
cludes the symmetric extendible states closest to the maxi-
mally entangled states. It is, however, not convex. The con-
ditions (22b) and (22c) describe four cones with vertex at the
maximally mixed state and a maximal circular base on each
face of the tetrahedron. The cones fill in the convex hull of
the first body, so that the body of symmetric extendible states
is just the convex hull of the body from condition (22a).
IV. THRESHOLDS FOR QKD SCHEMES
A. The Chau protocol
The two-way procedure to distill secret key from quantum
correlations in a prepare and measure scheme invented by
Gottesman and Lo [19] was proven by Chau [7] to work for
Bell-diagonal states with error rates that satisfy
(pI − pz)2 > (pI + pz)(px + py). (23)
This corresponds to a quantum bit error rate (QBER) of
27.64% for the six-state scheme (px = py = pz) and 20% for
BB84 (px = pz , py = 0). In this section, we show that when
this condition is satisfied, the procedure breaks the symmetric
extension in a finite number of rounds, as implied by Chau’s
result. When it is not satisfied, however, the procedure can
only output states with symmetric extension, and therefore no
key can be distilled. This is similar to the analysis by Acı´n
et al. [8], but since we know when a state has a symmetric
extension, we do not need to construct an explicit attack.
The procedure works by first applying a number of so-
called B-steps (for bit error detection) then P-steps (for phase
error correction) and in the end a one-way quantum error cor-
recting code. The B-step works on two bit pairs. On each
side, the parity of the bits is computed and compared to the
other side. If the parity differs, there must have been an error
and both pairs are discarded. If the parity is equal, the first
pair is kept. This step requires two-way communication since
both parties need to know if they should keep the first pair.
The P-step works on three bit pairs. The output bit on each
side is the parity of the three bits. This does not require any
communication at all, but it simulates a phase error correc-
tion step where two qubits are measured to give a phase error
syndrome which is sent from Alice to Bob for comparison.
Alternatively, we can look at it as keeping the two extra qubits
on each side in a shield system which limits Eve’s knowledge
about the key system [20]. Irrespective of how we look at it,
a P-step does not require communication from Bob to Alice
and can therefore not break a symmetric extension. If states
with symmetric extension are to be distilled into secret key,
the B-steps must break the symmetric extension, and we will
therefore concentrate on these in the following.
After a successful round of B-steps, the new error probabil-
ities are [7]:
poutI =
p2I + p
2
z
(pI + pz)2 + (px + py)2
, (24a)
poutx =
p2x + p
2
y
(pI + pz)2 + (px + py)2
, (24b)
pouty =
2pxpy
(pI + pz)2 + (px + py)2
, (24c)
poutz =
2pIpz
(pI + pz)2 + (px + py)2
. (24d)
To quantify how the procedure improves or deteriorates the
ability of a state to produce a key, as defined by Eq. (23), we
define the quantity2
DC := log2
(
(pI − pz)2
(pI + pz)(px + py)
)
. (25)
This quantity is positive on all distillable states, negative on
states where (pI − pz)2 < (pI + pz)(px + py), and zero
on the border. By inserting the recursion relation (24) into
Eq. (25), we see that DC doubles for every successful B-step,
DoutC = 2DC . Thus, if the state starts out with negative DC , it
will remain negative, if it starts out being zero it will remain
so, and if it starts out being positive it can reach an arbitrary
positive value in a finite number of steps. We will next show
that this allows the procedure to break the symmetric exten-
sion when DC > 0 and not otherwise. More precisely, we
will show that reaching DC ≥ 2 is sufficient for breaking the
symmetric extension, whereas all states with DC ≤ 0 have a
symmetric extension.
To show this, we describe the states by the same param-
eters α that we used in the symmetric extension calcula-
tion and defined in Eqs. (2). In these coordinates, DC =
2 We do not care about the rate, so we expect no relation between DC and
the key rate. It is possible to have arbitrarily highDC and at the same time
arbitrarily low key rate.
8FIG. 1: The set of Bell-diagonal states that satisfies the rank-one Z condition (22a) (left), rank-two Z conditions (22b) or (22c) (center), and
the union of the two (right). The figures have a maximally entangled state on each vertex and the surfaces have the symmetry of the tetrahedron.
log2[2α22/(1 − α21)] does not depend on α3 at all. The equa-
tions for the surfaces of constant DC are then
α21 + 2 · 2−DCα22 = 1. (26)
These are the equations for ellipses with center in the ori-
gin, constant α1-semiaxis 1, and DC-dependent α2-semiaxis
2(DC−1)/2. The surfaces are plotted in Fig. 2. In the figure,
the ellipse that extends outside the state space and separates
region A and B is the surface where DC = 0. Inside that el-
lipse are thin dashed lines indicating DC = −1,−2, . . ., and
outside are similar lines indicating DC = 1, 2, . . .. The two
other curves relate to symmetric extension which we will deal
with next.
B. Symmetric extension for cross sections
If condition (22a) is satisfied, the corresponding state has
a symmetric extension. Since the conditions (22b) and (22c)
only fill the convex hull of this body, we will only need to
consider the body described by inequality (22a) and its convex
hull here.
Unlike the surfaces for constant DC , the surface of the set
of extendible states is dependent on α3. In comparing sym-
metric extension to the DC surfaces, we will be particularly
interested in three cross sections through the symmetric ex-
tension surface. One is through the center of the tetrahe-
dron that defines the state space, where α3 = 0 (px = py).
The two others are the two faces of the tetrahedron where
α3 = ±(1− α1)/
√
2 (py = 0 and px = 0).
For the cross section where px = py , we set α3 = 0 in
Eq. (22a) to get the equation
α22
4
(
4
(
α1 − 12
)2
+ α22 − 1)
)
= 0 (27)
for the border. This tells us that any state with α2 = 0 (and
at the same time α3 = 0) has symmetric extension, and they
Φ−
Φ+
1
−1
−2
−3
Ψ±
2
3
4α2
α1
(1, 0)
(−1, 0)
(0, 1√
2
)
(0,− 1√
2
)
A
C
D
A
B
C
D
B
S
FIG. 2: Plot of the Bell-diagonal state space as a function of α1 and
α2, with α3 projected out. The thin dashed lines indicate the value
of DC . The shaded region S corresponds to separable states (for at
least some α3). Region A is the set of entangled states for which the
B-steps fail to break a symmetric extension. The border between A
and B corresponds to DC = 0. Regions A and B together are the
entangled states with symmetric extension for all possible values of
α3, while in region C all the states with α3 = 0 have a symmetric
extension; but some states with other α3 do not. In region D, no
states have symmetric extension. The borders between regions B and
C and regions C and D both have the shape of ellipses. The former is
described by Eq. (30), while the latter is described by Eq. (28).
9also happen to be separable. When α2 6= 0, we get
4
(
α1 − 12
)2
+ α22 = 1 (28)
which describes an ellipse with center in (α1, α2) = (1/2, 0),
α1-semiaxis 1/2, and α2-semiaxis 1. In Fig. 2 this is the solid
curve separating regions C and D.
For the cases py = 0 and px = 0, we insert α3 = ±(1 −
α1)/
√
2 into Eq. (22a) to get
− 1
36
(
9
4
(
α1 − 13
)2
+
3
2
α22 − 1
)2
≥ 0, (29)
which simplifies to
9
4
(
α1 − 13
)2
+
3
2
α22 = 1. (30)
This describes another ellipse, with center in (1/3, 0), α1-
semiaxis 2/3, and α2-semiaxis
√
2/3. This is the solid line
separating regions B and C in Fig. 2.
The outer (α3 = 0) symmetric extension curve (between C
and D in Fig. 2) defines a border with no states with symmetric
extension on the outside (for any α3). This is because if a state
defined by (α1, α2, α3) has a symmetric extension, so does
the state defined by (α1, α2,−α3) since the states are related
by local unitaries. Then the convex combination (α1, α2, 0)
would also have a symmetric extension. The inner symmetric
extension curve [α3 = ±1/
√
2(1− α1), between B and C] is
the border where all the states inside it has symmetric exten-
sion for all α3, since they can be obtained by mixing the states
with symmetric extension on the surface of the state space.
C. Distillability vs. symmetric extension
We are now in a position to relate DC to symmetric ex-
tension. From Fig. 2, it is evident that in most of the state
space, the surface DC = 2 lies strictly outside the outer
border for symmetric extension (the line between C and D).
Toward the point (1, 0), however, all the lines for constant
DC , symmetric extension border, and separability border con-
verge. This is also the state toward which the sequence of
states after the B-steps converges for the most relevant start-
ing states (e.g. all states with pI ≥ 0.5, pz > 0). Even
though this is a separable state, in any neighborhood around it
there will be states without symmetric extension. By inserting
DC = 2 in Eq. (26), the DC = 2 border can be described
by α22 = 2 − 2α21 =: f(α1). Similarly, the outer border
for symmetric extension from Eq. (28) can be expressed as
α22 = 1 − 4(α1 − 1/2)2 =: g(α1). Taking the difference,
we get ∆(α22) = f(α1) − g(α1) = 2(α1 − 1)2 ≥ 0, so the
DC = 2 surface is always outside the symmetric extension
surface, except for the point (1, 0) where DC is not defined.
Thus, no states for which DC ≥ 2 has a symmetric exten-
sion. In a similar fashion, one can show that the Chau border
DC = 0 never is outside the inner symmetric extension border
(between regions B and C) in the interval α1 ∈ [0, 1], which
is the region where the Chau border is contained in the state
space. They coincide at the points (0, 1/
√
2) and (1, 0). Thus,
any state with DC ≤ 0 has a symmetric extension.
To apply this to the six-state and BB84 QKD schemes,
let us assume that Alice and Bob discard the data specify-
ing which bits come from which bases, meaning the error
rates in the different bases are identical. Only one possi-
ble state is consistent with the observed error rate q, namely,
q/2 = px = py = pz . This immediately yields qmax =
(5−√5)/10 ≈ 27.64% for DC = 0.
From the BB84 measurements, only the error rates in the
x and z basis can be observed, meaning the state is not
completely determined, only that q = qx = qz for qx :=
py + pz and qz := px + py . If q is below 1/2, the pos-
sible eigenvalues are (1 − 2q, q, 0, q) + t(1,−1, 1,−1) for
t ∈ [0, q/2]. When expressed in terms of (α1, α2, α3), this
becomes (1− 2q,√2(1− 3q), q√2) + t(0, 2√2,−2√2). To
determine if DC ≤ 0 for any of the possible states, we min-
imize 2DC = 2α22/(1 − α21). This amounts to minimizing
|α2|, since α1 is fixed by q, and it is obvious by inspection
that t = 0 gives the minimum. Solving DC = 0, we find
qmax = 1/5.
D. Variations of B-steps
In our analysis, we have used the B-steps introduced in [19]
and inspired from classical advantage distillation (CAD) [21].
CAD works on blocks of N bits and Alice and Bob both an-
nounce the parities of all bits with the first bit. They keep the
first bit if all the parities are equal, otherwise they discard the
block. Given the announced parities, there are only two pos-
sible bit strings compatible with the announcements, namely,
the correct string and the inverted string. It is easy to see that
when the block size for CAD is N = 2n, it is equivalent to
n successful rounds of B-steps (when the whole block is dis-
carded if any of the B-steps fail). To make sure that even
for N 6= 2n CAD cannot break symmetric extension for any
states were B-steps fail, we can compute the output state af-
ter CAD. The input state is N copies of a Bell-diagonal state,
which we think of as a maximally entangled state |Φ+〉 which
has a probability pi for having suffered a σi error on Bob’s
qubit. The output qubit has a bit error (either σx or σy) iff all
the qubits in the block had a bit error and it has no bit error
iff no qubit in the block had a bit error. The other bit error
patterns are detected and the block is discarded. The output
qubit has a phase error (σy or σz) if an odd number of input
qubits had a phase error, and no phase error if an even number
of input qubits had a phase error. So the output qubit is error
free if and only if an even number of input qubits had a σz
error and the rest were error free. The probability for this to
happen given the state of the input qubits is pCADI = p
N
I +(
N
2
)
pN−2I p
2
z +
(
N
4
)
pN−4I p
4
z + · · · =
∑bN/2c
j=0
(
N
2j
)
pN−2jI p
2j
z .
This is every second term in the expansion of (pI ± pZ)N ,
and by taking the average of the ± cases we get the terms
we want, pCADI =
1
2
(
(pI + pz)N + (pI − pz)N
)
. By making
10
similar arguments, we get pCADz from the terms with an odd
number of σz errors, and pCADx and p
CAD
y from the cases where
there are σx and σy errors instead of 1 and σz . This gives the
following generalization of Eqs. (24):
pCADI =
bN/2c∑
j=0
(
N
2j
)
pN−2jI p
2j
z
=
1
2
(
(pI + pz)N + (pI − pz)N
)
, (31a)
pCADz =
b(N−1)/2c∑
j=0
(
N
2j + 1
)
p
N−(2j+1)
I p
2j+1
z
=
1
2
(
(pI + pz)N − (pI − pz)N
)
, (31b)
pCADx =
1
2
(
(px + py)N + (px − py)N
)
, (31c)
pCADy =
1
2
(
(px + py)N − (px − py)N
)
, (31d)
where the sum of these probabilities gives the probability for
CAD to succeed. From this, it follows directly that DCADC =
NDC , so having the liberty to choose block sizes other than
2n does not help if DC ≤ 0.
Another observation is that the announcement of anyN−1
independent parity bits on a block of N bits is equivalent to
performing CAD on a subset of M ≤ N of those bits. This
can be seen simply by counting the number of possible strings.
On the block of N bits, there are 2N possible strings. Each
announced parity bit halves this number, so after N − 1 parity
bits there are only two possible strings left. Any bits that are
equal in the two strings are therefore completely revealed by
the announcement. The remainingM bits are all different and
the CAD on those M bits is the same as announcing that we
have one of those possible substrings. Hence, nothing that
generates a bit fromN bits by announcingN −1 independent
parity bits can break the symmetric extension.
V. DISCUSSION
We have characterized the Bell-diagonal states that have a
symmetric extension. Using this we have shown that the fail-
ure of Chau’s procedure to distill key from certain entangled
states can be understood in terms of failure to break a sym-
metric extension. Also, some simple variations of the B-steps
are shown to be equivalent with respect to distillability. The
natural question now is if any other modification of the pro-
cedure can distill key from these states. Bae and Acı´n [22]
attempted to improve the thresholds by adding noise in the
beginning of the procedure, allowing coherent quantum oper-
ation on one side or measuring in a different basis, but without
success. Portmann [23] investigated BB84 with the bit error
detection using random parities but could only prove security
up to a QBER of 16.9%. We believe that the symmetric ex-
tension can be a useful tool for narrowing down which type of
postprocessing, if any, can distill a secret key beyond current
thresholds.
In the analysis, we have depended on the fact that the state
after sifting can be considered to be Bell-diagonal, when one
only considers the quantum bit error rate in the different bases.
While the state really is Bell-diagonal for a Pauli channel, it
may be different in general and this would show up as corre-
lations in the data where Alice and Bob measure in different
bases. For other protocols, such as SARG04 [6] and proto-
cols based on spherical codes [24], the sifting works as a filter
so the state will not be Bell diagonal even for a Pauli channel.
In these cases, the twirling procedure may actually turn a state
without symmetric extension into one that has. Any two-qubit
pure state can be written in the Bell-basis
|ψ〉 = α0|Φ+〉+ α1|Ψ+〉+ α2|Ψ−〉+ α3|Φ−〉
and by choosing |αj | = √pj , twirling will give a Bell-
diagonal state with eigenvalues pj . If those pj are chosen
such that the Bell-diagonal state has symmetric extension and
the pure state is not a product state, the twirling will intro-
duce a symmetric extension that was not there to begin with.
The most extreme example of this is when αj = exp(ipij/2).
Then the pure state is maximally entangled and since the cor-
relations are in the wrong bases, the twirled state is maximally
mixed. A natural question is then what we can say about the
symmetric extension for more general states, and this will be
considered elsewhere [25].
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